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Abstract 
We analyze the application of bright reference pulses to prevent the photon-number-splitting 
attack in weak-pulse quantum key distribution. Under the optimal eavesdropping strategy as far as 
we know, the optimal parameters of bright reference and signal pulses can ensure a secure 
transmission distance up to 146 km. To realize the quantum key distribution scenario with 
up-present techniques, we present an experimentally feasible scheme to create a large splitting 
ratio between bright reference and signal pulses, and to switch the bright reference pulses away 
from signal pulses to avoid the after-pulse disturbance. 
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I. Introduction 
Quantum cryptography (QC) can achieve absolutely secure communications [1], which is 
guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [2]. However, the practical QC is 
limited in distance by the bottleneck of the up-present techniques such as lossy quantum channel, 
imperfect detectors and single-photon sources. As a result, the game between sender and 
eavesdropper still exists [3-5]. Thanks to the improvements of single-photon detectors and 
quantum channel, the experimental quantum key distribution (QKD) has made great progress ever 
since the first experimental demonstration at only 30-cm distance in 1989 [6]. And now the QKD 
could be implemented in more than 100 km in single-mode fibers [7, 8]. Almost all these QKD 
experiments used the weak pulse sources since ideal single-photon sources [9] are still immature 
for practical QKD applications. Although the security of practical QKDs with weak-pulse sources 
has been proved [10], the secure distance of these QKDs are highly limited by the 
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack.  
In the PNS-attack scenario, Eve splits the multi-photon pulses which are unavoidable in 
weak-pulse source due to the Poissonian statistic feature of the classical source. Then she can take 
at least one photon and store it in the quantum memory while sending the residual to Bob through 
her ideal channel. Eve maintains the quantum states until Alice broadcasts her basis information. 
Then she probes the photons with the same basis according to Alice’s broadcasted information, 
and obtains the information of the multi-photon pulses as the same as Alice. Eve’s ideal channel 
can ensure these multi-photon pulses reach Bob’s set-up without attenuation and generate the 
same key rates as Bob’s expectation value without the contribution of single-photon pulses. Eve 
forces all Bob’s information to be generated from the multi-photon pulses by suppressing 
single-photon pulses, she can thus eavesdrop all the information Bob obtained (from the 
multi-photon pulses only) without being discovered as all Bob’s information is decoded after a 
lossy channel.  
Hwang, Wang, and H. K. Lo put forward decoy states in Ref. [11] that extend the unconditional 
transmission distance up to 140 km. The decoy states can actively monitor the PNS attacks by 
analyzing the yields of signal and decoy-state photons. The original scenario requires infinite 
decoy states, which is difficult for practical applications. Later on, practical decoy-state scenarios 
were developed [12] on the basis of long-term stable operation to collect enough decoy and signal 
states. So far, almost all the long-term stable QKDs in long-distance fiber are based on phase 
encoding, which are difficult to produce multi-decoy states at a high speed. Fortunately, an active 
feedback technique to auto-compensate unpredictable polarization scrambling enables the control 
on single-photon pulse polarization for more than 10 hours in long-distance fiber up to 100 km 
[13]. Experimental results of long-term operations in 50, 75 and 100 km fibers indicate that such a 
single-photon pulse polarization control supports stable polarization-encoding in long-distance 
fibers to facilitate stable “one-way” fiber system for polarization-encoded QKD, which can be 
readily extended for high-speed decoy-state QKD applications. 
 In this paper, we present a detailed theoretical analysis on a practical QKD scenario with 
bright reference pulses (BRPs) to prevent against the PNS attack. This paper is organized as 
follows. After this brief introduction, we introduce the principle of BRPs-QKD scenario and its 
derivatives in Sec. II. In Sec. III we present an optimal eavesdropping strategy and the optimal 
parameters for the practical implementation of BRPs-QKD. BRPs-QKD requires a large splitting 
ratio between bright reference and signal pulses. We discuss a practical solution to meet this 
requirement in Sec. IV, where we also present an experimentally feasible scheme to switch the 
bright reference pulses away from signal pulses to avoid the after-pulse disturbance. A brief 
summary is given in Sec. V.  
II. Bright reference pulses in quantum key distribution 
It is simple to beat PNS attack with bright reference pulses (BRPs) in phase-encoded QKD 
system with weak-pulse sources. The scenario came from the original B92 protocol [14], which 
aimed to prevent the intercept-resend attacks. Figure 1 presents the typical schematic set-up in a 
fiber QKD system. Alice uses an unsymmetrical Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZ1) to produce 
a BRP followed by a weak signal pulse. Bob uses another unsymmetrical Mach-Zehnder (MZ2) to 
decode the signals. If the arm length difference of MZ1 is the same as that of MZ2, there are three 
photon pulses that enter Bob’s single-photon detectors successively. The first photon pulse is 
attenuated by both BS1 and BS2, signed as the dim pulse (D). The second photon pulse is 
attenuated by BS1 or BS2 which include Alice and Bob’s phase information, signed as the signal 
pulse (S). The third photon pulse encounters no attenuation, signed as the BRP (B). In the ideal 
condition, Bob can detect the BRP every clock cycle. If Eve wants to suppress both the signal 
pulses and the BRPs, Bob will detect Eve immediately. Otherwise if Eve only suppresses the 
signal pulses, the BRPs will produce half interference errors in Bob’s MZ interferometer. Alice 
and Bob can find her by comparing their bit error rate.  
The application of BRPs against PNS attacks was first mentioned in Ref. [15]. Shortly, M. 
Koashi put forward a new scenario with an individual channel to transmit BRPs against PNS 
attacks [16]. Nevertheless, its practical applications in long-distance fiber are difficult due to the 
unpredictable phase drifts. Ref. [17] presents a sideband detection scheme that uses BRPs to beat 
PNS attacks. The time-bin of signal pulses at the sideband frequencies ω0+Ω and ω0−Ω are the 
same as that of the BRPs at ω0. Then the only way to avoid the disturbance of BRPs is to improve 
the isolation of the filter, which is limited by the up-present techniques. From the experimental 
points of view, the scenarios of Refs. [16, 17] are difficult for long-distance QKD applications, 
while the original scenario of BRPs in Ref. [14] is more practicable. In what follows, we will 
concentrate our theoretical analysis on BRPs against PNS attacks in the typical BB84 protocol. 
III. Optimal eavesdropping scenario and optimal parameters of BRPs 
Eve is assumed to have an infinite power obeying the physics laws. In accordance with either 
single-photon or multi-photon pulses used in QKD, Eve may choose different optimal 
eavesdropping strategies. For the case of multi-photon pulses, Eve can split at least one photon for 
probe, which causes no error disturbance to Bob. Unlike the general PNS attack, Eve cannot 
suppress any single-photon pulses as Bob monitors the BRPs every clock cycle. On the other hand, 
she cannot increase the yields of multi-photon pulses more than their original yields without 
splitting attack, because the increase of their yields will betray Eve to Bob. For the case of 
single-photon pulses, there are two representative scenarios: intercept-resend attack [4] and 
individual attack [5]. In intercept-resend attack, Eve intercepts the single-photon pulses for 
measurement. Then she prepares new photon-pulses as her measurement results, and resends them 
to Bob. In the individual attack, Eve prepares a probe initially in a standard state and lets it interact 
unitarily with the photon state sent by Alice. She stores the probe until Alice broadcasts her basis, 
then she measures it. Both scenarios will cause disturbance to Bob even though no additional 
photon loss is caused in the quantum channel. Eve has a trade-off between the information and the 
disturbance. According to the analysis in Refs. [4, 5], the individual attack will obtain more 
information than the intercept-resend attack at the same disturbance. To sum up, Eve can choose 
the individual attack against the single-photon pulses and the photon-splitting attack against the 
multi-photon pulses to form her optimal eavesdropping. 
 We suppose that Bob has high-performance single-photon detectors without any after-pulses. 
The photon pulses obey the Poissonian distribution Pn(μ)=e-μ μn /n!. The mean photon numbers of 
signals and BRPs are μS and μΒ, respectively. The probability that i-photon-number pulses 
detected by Bob is given by 
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where ηt is the channel transmission efficiency (ηt =10-0.21L/10 for a fiber distance L), and ηd is the 
detecting efficiency of Bob’s detectors (including the losses of Bob’s decoding components). The 
overall probability of empty detection of the BRPs is given by 
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Note that Eve cannot change Bob’s detecting probabilities of signal pulses and BRPs. She can at 
best suppress GB(0) of the single-photon number pulses to maximize her information as what she 
does in the general PNS attack. For a fixed channel transmission efficiency ηt, one can always find 
a suitable μΒ to keep GB(0) at a negligible value. For the sake of simplicity, we neglect the 
contribution of GB(0) to get the best parameters such as the optimal μσ  and the longest possible 
transmission distance for the BRPs-QKD.  
As proved by Wyner et. al. [18], the communication between Alice and Bob can be absolutely 
secure when Bob’s information is more than Eve’s, which can be realized by choosing an 
appropriate data coding. The security criterion can be set as IAB>IAE, where IAB and IAE are the 
mutual information of Alice with Bob and Eve, respectively. The mutual information between 
Alice and Bob is given by  
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where D is Bob’s bit error rate and for the sake of simplicity, we only consider all the errors are 
caused by Eve’s disturbance. The mutual information between Alice and Eve includes gains of 
multi-photon pulses and single-photon pulses. The gain of multi-photon pulses causes no 
disturbance and therefore Eve can obtain 100% correct information from Alice, which produces a 
contribution to the mutual information given by 
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where Yexp is Bob’s expected click of all the photon pulses, which is given by  
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And Y1 is Bob’s expected click of single-photon pulses, which is given by 
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As ηtηd  is quite small, we can approximately get Yexp ≈ ηtηdμs and Y1 ≈ (μs-P1(μs))/μs. 
The other gain of the mutual information comes from the single-photon pulses. According to 
Ref. [5], this part can be estimated by ))1(2(
2
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)1ln()1()1ln()1()( zzzzz −−+++=φ . As we consider the binary communication in our 
case, we change ln to log2 in the above expression. The mutual information contributed by the 
single-photon pulse can then be approximately written as 
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where )1(2/1' EveEve DDD −−= , and DEve is the bit error rate of the part of single-photon 
pulses. Then the total mutual information between Alice and Eve is given by 
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Since no disturbance is induced in the quantum channel as Eve obtains the multi-photon pulses, 
the whole bit error rate comes from the part of single-photon pulses, which is given by 
)(1 s
s
Eve P
DD
μ
μ ⋅
= ,                                 (9) 
We numerically calculate the Eq. 8 with μs varying from 0.1 to 1.0 and obtain the mutual 
information IAE between Alice and Eve versus Bob’s error bit rate (D). These results are compared 
with the mutual information IAB between Alice and Bob calculated by using Eq. 3, as well as IAE 
for the ideal single-photon source. As shown in Fig.2, the secure bound of D comes close to the 
case of the ideal single-photon source as μs varies from 1.0 to 0.1. This is expected for the ideal 
case when we neglect GB(0), where we only consider the bit error from disturbance induced by 
Eve. However, this dose not necessarily imply that the small mean photon number of the signals 
are preferable in a practical QKD application, where Bob’s bit error rate is actually determined by 
some important factors besides the disturbance of Eve. One of the unavoidable bit errors at Bob’s 
site comes from the dark-count and back-ground noises detected by Bob (YBob(0)). Another factor 
that contributes to Bob’s bit errors in practice is the probability that the photon enters the wrong 
detector (edetector), which is most likely caused by the optical errors, independent of the 
transmission distance. By taking those factors into account, we can express Bob’s bit error rate in 
the practical QKD application by 
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where e0 is the error probability caused by YBob(0). As YBob(0) randomly takes place, we have 
e0=1/2. DBob is a function of ηt (L) and μs. From Eq. 6, we find DBob varies with the 
transmission distance.  
In order to estimate the security of the practical system of a BRPs-QKD, we consider in 
what follows the dependence of the key generation rate with the transmission distance rather 
than the mutual information dependence on the bit error rate. The key generation rate is 
defined by the probability to generate the valid key per pulse, which is determined by not only 
the mutual efficiency (referring to the bit error rate) but also the transmission efficiency of the 
channel (referring to the channel loss). The key generation rates of Bob and Eve are given by 
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The security criterion can be equivalently written as RBob>REve. In order to show the capacity of 
the QKD system, we define the difference between Bob’s and Eve’s key generation rate as 
EveBobS RRR −= .                              (12) 
Bob can receive secure keys from Alice when RS>0. Otherwise, their communication is too risk to 
avoid eavesdropping when RS<=0. We set the low bound of Bob’s key generation rate as RBob= 
REve. Taking as an example, we use the experimental data reported in Ref. [7] to estimate the 
scenario. The relevant experimental data are as follows. The detection efficiency of Bob’s 
setup is ηd=0.045, the bit error rate edetector~3.3%, the loss of fiber 0.21dB/km at 1550 nm, and 
YBob(0)=1.7×10-6. Taking these data into the Eqs. (10-12), we numerically calculate RS with 
various μs versus transmission distance. As shown in Fig.3, the optimal value of μs is 
converged to 0.5 to ensure the longest secure distance up to 146 km and the largest key 
generation rate at the same transmission distance. This can be understood qualitatively as 
follows. For the weak pulse with a mean photon number μs used in the practical BRPs-QKD 
system, the multi-photon probability increases with μs, and this part of the information will be 
leaked to Eve without any disturbance. On the other hand, DBob is inversely proportional to μs, 
which implies that Eve obtains information of single-photon pulses slowly when μs increases. 
As a result, μs=0.5 is a balance point between these the gains from the multi-photon and 
single-photon pulses.  
After the optimal μs is obtained for the secure BRPs-QKD, we can then estimate μB for its 
practical implementation. We assume that Eve can only suppress 1/1000 of single-photon 
pulses. This corresponds to 
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And this magnitude of GB(0) is of no use for Eve. Taking μs=0.5 into Eqs. (2) and (13), we 
find that the low bound of mean photon number μB is exponentially changed with the distance. 
It should be 2×105 at least for the longest secure distance of 146 km at μs=0.5.  
IV. Some improvements for the practical application 
The analysis in Sec. III presents the capability of BRPs against PNS attack. If we want to 
operate the longest distance QKD with the weak pulse source which is secure against the PNS and 
individual attacks, the best parameters we should choose are μs=0.5 and μB≥2×105. As a result, 
we can implement a 146-km BRPs-QKD. In practice, there still exist two main difficulties to 
apply BRPs at such a long distance. One is to make perfect interference between signal pulses 
and bright reference pulses, as μs is much smaller than μB. The other is to make sure that Bob will 
detect the BRP every clock cycle without affecting the measurement of signal pulses.  
To create a large ratio as μB : μs =2×105 : 0.5, the splitting ratio of BS1 and BS2 should be 2×
105 : 0.5. With up-present techniques, the single beam splitter cannot realize such a large ratio 
either in space or in fiber. However, a combination between a splitter and an attenuator works for 
this purpose. For example, we may choose experimental parameters as follows for the schematic 
set-up of the weak-pulse QKD with BRPs in Fig.1. The intensity of the input laser is 8×105 
photons per pulse, the attenuator is -56dB in the short arm of Alice’s and Bob’s MZ 
interferometers, and the splitting ratio of BS1 to BS4 is 1:1. The mean photon numbers of the 
signal pulses and BRPs are  Ll=2×105 and LS=0.5, respectively. After transmission of a 
146-km fiber (ηt=8.6×10-4), the corresponding mean photon numbers at Bob’s site become 
Lll= 2×105ηt=172, Ll+S=LS+l=0.5ηt=4.3×10-4, and LSS=1.3×10-5ηt=1.1×10-8, for BRPs, 
signal pulses(interference between weak pulses and BRPs), and dim pulses, respectively. This 
makes the experimental implementation feasible.     
It is more difficult to monitor the BRPs without disturbance to the signal measurement. 
Differing from Ref. [17], the BRPs reach the detectors with a time difference Δt after the signal 
pulses in our case. Such a time difference can avoid any disturbance to the signal in the same 
clock cycles. However, the after-pulses caused by the BRPs may tremendously increase the false 
clicks to the next signals if the avalanche-photodiode based single-photon detectors are used. It 
may cause large errors at a high rate. For instance, it induces a bit error of 4E-3 per pulse at the 
repetition rate of 1 MHz when the probability of after-pulses is 0.8% after 1 μs [19]. To avoid 
after-pulses of the BRPs, it is almost impractical to use the same detectors for the signal pulses. 
The BRPs should be switched to other detectors. Fortunately, 10-GHz ultra-high-speed 
optical-switches are commercially available with a crosstalk less than -20dB. Such a low crosstalk 
induces negligible false clicks for the signal detection. To check the experimental feasibility, we 
measured the influence of crosstalk on signal detection by inputting sufficient BRP photons and 
detected photons at Bob’s site by using InGaAs avalanche-photodiode based single-photon 
detectors with the detecting gate at 1 MHz. With about 100 photons per pulse reaching the 
signle-photon detector at Bob’s site, we detected no false clicks for the signal. This simulates the 
typical above-mentioned experimental situation with a mean photon number of Lll= 172 reaching 
Bob’s components after 146-km fibers, under which there should be less than one photon per pulse 
reach the signal detectors with an optical switch of a crosstalk -20dB. This confirms that the BRPs 
bring about negligible disturbance to the signal detection in the practical BRP-QKD. The 
experimental implementation can be further simplified by doubling the intensity of the BRPs so 
that only one detector is needed to monitor the BRPs after either optical switch of both detection 
ports as shown in Fig. 1. 
V. Conclusion  
In conclusion, we analyze the scenario to beat the photon-number-splitting attacks with the 
bright reference pulses. We present the optimal eavesdropping as far as we know that Eve use PNS 
attack against multi-photon pulses and individual attack against single-photon pulses. Afterward 
we obtain the optimal operation parameters of BRPs with μs=0.5 and μB>2×105. For the 
eavesdropping strategy, the BRPs-QKD scenario ensures the secure transmission distance up to 
146 km in fiber at 1550 nm. Finally, we present a practical solution to create a large splitting ratio 
between bright reference and signal pulses for BRPs-QKD, and an experimentally feasible scheme 
to switch the bright reference pulses away from signal pulses to avoid the after-pulse disturbance. 
As a result, the BRPs-QKD scenario is highly secure in practical application. 
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Figure 1, Schematic setup of the weak-pulse QKD with the bright reference pulses, where BS1 
and BS2 are the asymmetric beam splitters, BS3 and BS4 are 1:1 beam splitters, PMA and PMB 
are phase modulators at Alice’s and Bob’s sites, respectively, and Detectors are used for 
single-photon detection. 
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Figure 2, Mutual information (I) vs disturbance (D) for BRPs-QKD with different mean photon 
number of signal pulses (μs), where the solid line is the mutual information between Alice and 
Bob (IAB), the dashed line is IAE with ideal single-photon source, and the dotted lines are IAE of 
different μs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, Key generation rate difference (RS) vs transmission distance for BRPs-QKD with 
different μs, where the solid line is RS with ideal single-photon source, the dashed and dotted lines 
are RS with different μs. 
 
 
 
